A proposal to help make credit ratings as accurate as possible by Romano, Alessandro
10/17/2016
A proposal to help make credit ratings as accurate as
possible
blogs.lse.ac.uk /businessreview/2016/10/17/a-proposal-to-help-make-credit-ratings-as-accurate-as-possible/
Fitch Ratings, by Solvency II Wire, under a CC-BY-2.0 licence
In a recently published article, we propose the introduction of a tailored liability regime to induce credit rating
agencies (CRAs) to produce ratings as accurate as the available forecasting technology allows.
In a nutshell, credit rating agencies issue judgements on the quality of financial assets reducing asymmetric
information on financial markets. In the recent years, their conduct has been closely scrutinised because many
believe that their behaviour contributed to sparkling the global financial crisis. In this vein, scholars and policymakers
noted that the CRAs business model is plagued by a fundamental conflict of interest, as they are paid by the same
issuers that they have to rate (issuer-pays model).
In our article, we argue the problem is more complex. In a well-functioning market, ratings have a value only if
investors consider them reliable. Therefore, if CRAs systematically misreported information in order to please their
clients they would soon lose credibility and their ratings would become worthless, regardless of the paying scheme
adopted. In addition to the conflict of interest, CRAs’ misbehaviour is determined by three concurring factors.
First, high ratings produce relevant regulatory benefits and hence they have a value irrespective of how
many people consider them reliable.
Second, some investors are naïve and even ex-post they cannot discriminate between accurate and
inaccurate ratings.
Third, forecasting techniques are imperfect because of uncertainty.
Addressing the joint effect of the above market failures, especially when combined with the issuer-pays model, is
very complex. On the one hand, regulators do not have enough information to specify how ratings should be
calculated in order to correct these market failures. On the other hand, courts can hardly monitor CRAs’ conduct to
determine whether it meets a standard of efficient care. Recent empirical evidence confirms that the quality of
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ratings has decreased after the introduction of more stringent regulations and fault liability in the United States.
Because regulation and negligence rules have proven ineffective, if not counterproductive, we propose a different
approach. We argue that the incentives of CRAs could be improved introducing a tailored strict liability rule: CRAs
should be liable to pay damages whenever a bond or a company they rate defaults. A rule of this kind poses three
problems. In particular: (i) covering all the losses resulting from the default of any rated issuer would almost
immediately bankrupt any CRA. (ii) CRAs cannot be expected to make absolutely accurate predictions.
In our article, we propose a solution for each of these problems. To address the first problem, we introduce a liability
cap. More precisely, we propose to calculate the liability by multiplying the price paid by the issuer for the inverse of
the highest probability of default associated with the cluster in which the issuer is included (higher rating implying
lower probability of default, hence, given the issuer fee, higher lability if default occurs).
We show that under this liability rule a CRA that issues accurate ratings will make zero profits, which is the outcome
in the presence of perfect competition. However, CRAs models cannot be assumed to be perfect because no
forecasting method can be perfectly accurate. For this reason, we introduce a parameter, α, which is a number
between 0 and 1 signifying the confidence of CRAs on their own forecasting methods. In our model, α must be
disclosed along with the publishing of any rating. If the chosen α is equal to 1, the CRA will pay a sum equal to the
liability cap and will avoid losses only if its predictions are perfectly accurate. For α=1/2 the CRA will pay half of the
liability cap, and so on. At the other extreme, for α=0 the CRA will be immune to liability, but the market will know that
the CRA does not trust its own judgement.
In other words, CRAs will be able to choose their own liability exposure, but in doing they it will also tell the market
how trustworthy they believe their ratings are. The key characteristic of α is contractibility. Issuers will want α to be
as high as possible, whereas CRAs will prefer lower values of α to minimise lability exposure. The opposing interest
of CRAs and issuers will ensure that the both ratings and α will reflect all available information in a competitive
market setting.
Finally, CRAs must be protected from systemic risk, which we define simply as correlated defaults. We solve the
problem differently because corporate bonds and structured finance products have different exposure to systemic
risk. For corporate bonds it is sufficient to set a time limit to liability exposure because corporate defaults are
correlated only in the medium to long term. We argue that CRAs should be held liable only if the rated firm goes
bankrupt three months (the typical “watchlist timing”) after receiving the rating.
Contrariwise, the defaults of structured finance products are strongly correlated also in the short term. For this
reason, we develop a mechanism that ensures that CRAs are liable only if rating inaccuracy is confirmed by the law
of large numbers. We propose that a public authority records the ratings issued by the CRAs, the fees they receive,
and the frequency of defaults of each structured finance product. Within a given interval (e.g. 5 years) , the public
authority will compare the predicted probability of defaults with the observed frequency of defaults. Only if this
comparison reveals that the CRA underestimated the probability of default over a long time horizon (importantly
including the period preceding the burst of a bubble), liability will be imposed on the CRA. This correction to our strict
liability regime is effectively a countercyclical macro-prudential regulation.
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Notes:
This article is based on the authors’ paper A Strict Liability Regime for Rating Agencies , in American Business
Law Journal, Volume 52, Issue 4, Winter 2015 , Pages 673–720.
The post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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